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ABSTRACT: This paper experimentally explores how the enforcement of cooperative 
behavior in a social dilemma is facilitated through institutional as well as emotional 
mechanisms. Recent studies emphasize the importance of anger and its role in motivating 
individuals to punish free riders. However, we find that anger also triggers retaliatory 
behavior by the punished individuals. This makes the enforcement of a cooperative norm 
more costly. We show that in addition to anger, ‘social’ emotions like guilt need to be present 
for punishment to be an effective deterrent of uncooperative actions. They play a key role by 
subduing the desire of punished individuals to retaliate and by motivating them to behave 
more cooperatively in the future. 
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 1. Introduction 
An important mechanism for the promotion of cooperation is the enforcement of 
social norms (Ostrom, 1998; Fehr and Gächter, 2000a; Boyd and Richerson, 2005). As 
shown by Fehr and Gächter (2000b), cooperative behavior can persist when there is an 
opportunity to punish defectors. However, although punishment can have desirable 
consequences, it can also have negative effects (Fehr and Rockenbach, 2003). For 
example, punishment can lead to welfare losses (Egas and Riedl, 2005) with a 
sometimes negligible increase in cooperation levels (Gächter and Herrmann, 2005). 
Studying the choices of individuals who punish as well as the reaction of those who 
are punished can help us predict when punishment will have negative results. 
Considering the role of emotions seems to be necessary to understand this kind of 
behavior (Loewenstein, 1996; Elster, 1999; Thaler, 2000). 
The goal of this paper is to understand the type of motivations that must be 
present, among both the punishers and the punished, for punishment to be an effective 
institution for the promotion of cooperation. We concentrate on the role of social 
emotions, such as shame and guilt, as an essential component for the successful 
enforcement of cooperative norms. In particular, we are interested in their role as 
inhibitors of retaliatory behavior by the punished individuals. 
Although it has attracted little attention, antisocial behavior such as retaliation 
or the punishment of cooperative individuals has been observed in various kinds of 
laboratory experiments, including, for example, public good games (Fehr and Gächter, 
2000b), prisoner dilemma games (Falk, Fehr, and Fischbacher, 2005), and 
moonlighting games (Abbink, Irlenbusch, and Renner, 2000). This type of behavior is 
widespread and is observed in around one quarter of all subjects (e.g. Falk, Fehr, and 
Fischbacher, 2000; Cinyabuguma, Page, and Putterman, 2004). 
We study, by means of an experiment, antisocial behavior in a social dilemma 
game. We introduce a punishment institution where individuals who are punished 
always have the opportunity to retaliate. After all, if a punishment technology exists, it 
is likely that both the punisher and the punished have access to it. Our results show 
that many individuals do retaliate after being punished. In various cases, this escalates 
as individuals punish each other in turns. In order to observe the effect of retaliation 
on future behavior, subjects played the game twice. We find that although retaliation 
considerably increases the cost of punishing selfish behavior, it does not deter future 
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cooperation or punishment. Hence, its effect seems to be restricted to welfare losses 
caused by the destruction of resources.   
Recent research has revealed that emotions motivate individuals to punish 
opportunistic behavior. In particular, anger has been shown to be of influence when 
subjects have to decide whether to punish or not. Unkind behavior induces anger and 
the angrier people are, the more likely they are to incur costs in order to penalize such 
behavior (Bosman and van Winden, 2002; Quervain et al., 2004). We replicate these 
findings and extend this line of research by studying the emotional reaction of 
punished individuals. 
In order to explain the behavior of both punishers and punished, we measure 
their emotional response. Our results show that individuals who act unkindly do 
nevertheless feel angry when punished. Furthermore, we find that high intensities of 
anger are related to positive retaliation. Therefore, anger alone induces multiple 
rounds of punishment and consequently, causes a significant destruction of resources. 
Thus, anger cannot explain whether punishment will effectively promote prosocial 
behavior. The effectiveness of punishment depends on the reaction of the individuals 
who are punished. 
What is missing to make punishment effective is a ‘moral’ reaction of the 
punished. Namely, after receiving punishment the punished individual should act 
more cooperatively and abstain from retaliation. We show that the social emotions of 
shame and guilt motivate individuals to react in precisely this way. In other words, 
individuals do not retaliate when feelings of guilt restrain their anger-induced desire to 
fight back. 
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the design of the 
experiment. Section 3 describes the subjects’ behavior. In Section 4 we analyze the 
relationship between the emotions and the behavior of the punishers and the punished. 
Section 5 discusses the results and concludes. 
2. The Experiment 
Lately, punishment mechanisms have been mostly analyzed in the context of public 
good games (using the design of Fehr and Gächter, 2000b). However, in this study we 
use a simpler setting where the causes and effects of emotions can be easily observed 
and analyzed. To study the impact of social emotions, we used a two-person social 
dilemma game with and without punishment opportunities. Our game is similar to 
many of the social dilemma games in the literature, such as, the sequential prisoners’ 
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dilemma, the investment game (Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe, 1995), the gift 
exchange game (Akerlof, 1982; Fehr, Kirchsteiger, and Riedl, 1993), and others. 
2.1. The game 
We first describe the game without punishment opportunities and then we explain how 
punishment is introduced. The game consists of two players taking part in a one-shot 
game. We will refer to these players as the ‘first mover’ and the ‘second mover’. At 
the start of the game, the first mover receives 150 points whereas the second mover 
receives 100 points (see Figure 1 for the game tree). In the first stage, the first mover 
decides to either defect or cooperate. If the first mover defects, he keeps his 150 
points, the second mover keeps her 100 points, and the game ends. If the first mover 
cooperates, 50 of his 150 points are multiplied by six and transferred to the second 
mover. Thus, the second mover receives 300 points while the first mover loses 50 
points. In the second stage, the second mover returns an amount of points (r) back to 
the first mover. Specifically, she can return 150 points (an equal split of the gains), 50 
points (returning exactly the points lost by the first mover), or 0 points. After the 
decision of the second mover the game ends. Hence, if the first mover cooperates his 
payoff is π1 = 100 + r and the payoff of the second mover is π2 = 100 + 6 × 50 – r. 
This describes the game without punishment. 
First
mover
Second
mover
π1 = 150
π2 = 100
π1 = 100
π2 = 400
π1 = 150
π2 = 350
π1 = 250
π2 = 250
r = 50
r = 0
r = 
150
defect
cooperate
 
FIGURE 1 – GAME TREE IN THE CASE OF NO PUNISHMENT OPPORTUNITIES 
In the game with punishment both players can assign punishment points. Doing so is 
costly for both players. We denote pit as the amount of points assigned by player i (for 
i ∈ {1,2}) in punishment round t. After the second mover decides how much to return, 
the first round of punishment starts. First, the first mover has the opportunity to assign 
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a nonnegative amount of punishment points to the second mover (p11). The first mover 
looses p11 points and the second mover looses 4 × p11 points. In order to avoid losses 
during the experiment, the first mover can assign punishment points only as long as 
the second mover has a positive number of points (i.e. ¼(100 + 6 × 50 – r) ≥ p11 ≥ 0). 
If the first mover chooses p11 = 0 the game ends. However, if the first mover chooses 
p11 > 0 the second mover is given the opportunity to assign punishment points to the 
first mover (p21). In order to avoid confusion, we will refer to punishment by the 
second mover as retaliation. Punishment by first movers and retaliation by second 
movers has the same cost and does the same amount of harm. Thus for each retaliation 
point assigned, the first mover looses four points. Once more, the second mover can 
assign retaliation points only as long the first mover has a positive number of points 
(i.e. ¼(100 + r – p11) ≥ p21 ≥ 0).1 If p21 = 0 the game ends, but if p21 > 0 the game 
continues to a second round of punishment. That is, the first mover has the 
opportunity to assign additional punishment points to the second mover (p12). As 
before, if p12 = 0 the game ends but if p12 > 0, the second mover has the opportunity to 
assign additional retaliation points (p22), and so on. The process repeats itself until 
either one of the players has zero points and cannot be punished further, or one of the 
players assigns zero punishment points. Therefore, if the first mover cooperates his 
payoff is π1 = 100 + r – Σt p1t – 4 × Σt p2t, and the payoff of the second mover is 
 π2 = 100 + 6 × 50 – r – Σt p2t – 4 × Σt p1t. 
If we use the standard assumption of rational individuals with self-regarding 
preferences, the unique subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium of the game with and 
without punishment, is for second movers to return zero points and thus for first 
movers not to cooperate.2 The predictions can change if individuals possess other-
regarding preferences such as a concern for unequal payoffs, efficient outcomes, 
and/or reciprocating kind and unkind actions.3 In the game without punishment, if the 
frequency of selfish individuals is sufficiently low then there can be equilibria where 
some second movers return positive amounts and some first movers cooperate. In the 
                                                 
1 Note that players can have negative earnings if by assigning punishment points to another player they 
reduce their own earnings below zero. This way subjects cannot avoid punishment or retaliation by 
reducing the earnings of others to zero. A show-up fee was given to cover any losses incurred during 
the experiment. 
2 Note that since punishment is always costly, it is never credible at any stage. 
3 See Rabin (1993), Fehr and Schmidt (1999), Bolton and Ockenfels (2000), Charness and Rabin 
(2002), Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2005), and Falk and Fischbacher (2005). 
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game with punishment, in addition to individuals who are willing to act kindly, there 
might be individuals who are willing to punish selfish behavior. If the expectation of 
punishment leads to higher returns from the second movers, then first movers have an 
additional incentive to cooperate.4 Certainly, the first movers’ willingness to punish 
depends on the propensity of second movers to retaliate, which in turn depends on the 
willingness of first movers to punish once again, and so on. This, in our opinion is a 
more realistic way of modeling social punishment. If both the punisher and the 
punished have access to the punishment technology, the punished will always have the 
opportunity to retaliate. Moreover, both players have the option to avoid further 
interaction by deciding not to punish and thus ending the game. To our knowledge, no 
other study examines punishment behavior in such a setting.5
2.2. Experimental design and procedures 
The computerized experiment was conducted in March 2005 in the CREED laboratory 
at the University of Amsterdam. In total 162 students participated in the experiment. 
Approximately 54% were students of economics and the rest came from a variety of 
fields. The average age was 22 years and 58% of the participants were male. 
Each subject played twice the social dilemma game described in the previous 
section. We used a perfect strangers matching protocol to avoid any reputation effects. 
In total, 26 subjects participated in the baseline treatment, without punishment 
opportunities. The remaining 136 subjects participated in the punishment treatment. 
The average earnings were 10.55 euros (this includes a show-up fee of 1 euro). The 
whole experiment lasted less than one hour. Subjects were recruited through the 
CREED recruitment website and the experiment was programmed with z-Tree 
(Fischbacher, 1999). 
After arrival in the reception room, subjects were randomly assigned to a table 
in the lab. Once everyone was seated, subjects were given the instructions for the 
                                                 
4 For example, using the same assumptions they use about the distribution of types, the model of Fehr 
and Schmidt (1999) predicts that, in the case of no punishment, 40% of second movers would return 
150 points. In this situation only 30% of first movers cooperate (the other 70% prefers to avoid the 
chance of ending up with extremely disadvantageous inequality). In the case of punishment, there are 
enough first movers that would punish so that all second movers return 150 points and hence all first 
movers cooperate. 
5 Nikiforakis (2005) studies punishment in a public good game in which retaliation was possible. 
However, in this case the punishment phase automatically ended after retaliation. 
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experiment (see Appendix A). Subjects were told that the experiment consisted of two 
independent parts. We emphasized the fact that they will interact with different 
individuals in each part, and that, their choices in the first part will not affect their 
earnings in the second part. After this, the one-shot social dilemma game was 
described as the first part of the experiment. When everybody had finished reading the 
instructions, subjects had to answer a few questions to ensure their understanding of 
the game. Subsequently, the subjects played the social dilemma game via the 
computer (part 1). At the end of the first part, instructions were distributed concerning 
the second part of the experiment. Subjects were told they would be in the same 
position as in the first part (i.e. first or second mover), and with certainty, their partner 
would be different partner from the one they had played with in the first part. After 
they finished the second part (part 2), subjects filled in a debriefing questionnaire. 
Thereafter, they were paid their earnings in private and dismissed. 
To observe if emotional reactions of shame and guilt influence behavior, we 
used self-reports to measure these and other emotions during the game. We also 
measured fairness perceptions and expectations concerning the behavior of the other 
player. Emotions were always measured after subjects observed the choice of the other 
player but before they made their own choice. Expectations about the behavior of the 
other player were asked after the subjects made their choice but before they observed 
the other player’s actual choice. Finally, fairness perceptions were measured at the end 
of the experiment in the debriefing questionnaire. 
The social emotions of guilt and shame are characterized by the absence of a 
clear physiological reaction pattern (Adolphs, 2002). Since the goal of our study it to 
analyze the influence of these emotions on behavior, we applied self-reports, which 
are a reliable and often used technique in social psychology (Robinson and Clore, 
2002).6 We also used self-reported measures of expectations and fairness perceptions. 
Emotions as well as fairness perceptions were measured using seven-point scales.7 
Expectations were measured by asking for a point estimate of the most likely action. 
Even though our study concerns the influence of anger, shame, and guilt, we measured 
                                                 
6 For some emotions, such as anger, self-reports have been shown to be correlated with physiological 
measures of arousal (Ben-Shakhar et al., 2004). This supports the use of self-reports as a trustworthy 
measure of emotional intensity. 
7 Emotional intensity was measured from: 1 = ‘not at all’ to 7 = ‘very intensely’. The fairness of an 
action was measured from: 1 = ‘very unfair’ to 7 = ‘very fair’. The questions used are available in 
Appendix A. 
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a variety of emotions to avoid influencing subjects in a particular direction. The list of 
measured emotions included: anger, gratitude, guilt, happiness, irritation, shame, and 
surprise. 
3. Observed Behavior 
In this section, we give an overview and a brief discussion of the behavior of first and 
second movers. A summary of the behavioral data can be found in Appendix B. We 
start by investigating how often first movers cooperate and, when given the 
opportunity, how much second movers return. Comparing the baseline and the 
punishment treatments allows us to observe the effect of the punishment institution on 
the subjects’ behavior. Then, in order to explain any differences induced by 
punishment, we analyze the punishment behavior of first movers as well as the 
retaliatory behavior of second movers. Finally, we examine whether punishment and 
retaliation in part 1 have an effect on their behavior in part 2. 
3.1. Cooperation and returns 
Figure 2 summarizes the main differences between the baseline and the punishment 
treatment. Namely, first movers cooperate more often and second movers return more 
in the presence of punishment. 
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FIGURE 2  – COOPERATION BY FIRST MOVERS AND RETURNS BY SECOND MOVERS 
Note: A) Mean number of points sent by first movers in each part and treatment. Note that, since 
first movers could send only 0 or 50 points, doubling the amount sent gives the frequency of first 
movers who cooperate. B) Mean number of points returned by second movers in each part and 
treatment. For the frequency of second movers sending 0, 50 or 150 points see Appendix B. 
As can be seen in Figure 2A, in both treatments, almost all first movers cooperate in 
the first part (more than 84.6%). However, in the absence of punishment, cooperation 
decreases substantially in the second part. In contrast, if the opportunity to punish 
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others exists, first movers cooperate equally often in both parts. Testing for 
differences between treatments confirms this observation. There is no significant 
difference in the frequency of cooperation in the first part (p = 0.90) but a highly 
significant difference in the second part (p = 0.02).8 There is an even starker 
difference between treatments when we consider the behavior of second movers. That 
is, in part 1 and part 2, second movers return noticeably less in the absence of 
punishment (p = 0.01 and p = 0.07). Given the behavior of second movers, it is easy to 
understand the decrease in cooperation in the baseline treatment. Remember that first 
movers who cooperate send 50 points. In the baseline treatment, they receive on 
average a smaller amount in return. In contrast, first movers who cooperate in the 
punishment treatment receive back roughly twice the amount sent. It is clear that, even 
when it is possible to retaliate, punishment limits the opportunistic behavior of second 
movers. 
In spite of this, punishment did not lead to overall higher earnings. In part 1, 
the average earnings of all participants are actually higher in the baseline treatment 
(230.8 vs. 189.0 points), whereas in part 2, average earnings are higher in the 
punishment treatment (187.3 vs. 182.7 points). In neither case is the difference 
significant (p > 0.23). In the following paragraphs, we examine how subjects punish 
and retaliate. 
3.2. Punishment and retaliation 
As Figure 3A illustrates (see also Table B1), a large number of subjects are willing to 
spend some or all of their earnings in order to punish second movers or to retaliate 
against first movers. In fact, around one third of the cases in which first and second 
movers interact wind up in punishment by the first movers. If returns were less than 
150 points, about two thirds of the interactions end up in punishment (68.1%). When 
given the opportunity, retaliation by second movers is common but somewhat less 
frequent (40.0%). We even observe that, of the first movers who had the chance to 
                                                 
8 Throughout the chapter, unless it is otherwise noted, we use two-sided Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney tests. 
We use each subject as an independent observation for tests concerning either part 1 or part 2. If we 
combine the data of both parts, we first calculate for each subject the mean for the variable in question 
and then compute the test using these means as the independent observations. There are subjects from 
whom we have, for various variables, data from only one of the parts (e.g. a second mover who faces a 
first mover who cooperates in part 1 and a first mover who defects in part 2). In these cases, we take the 
data from the part for which we have information as that subject’s mean. 
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punish second movers who retaliated, 55.6% decided to do so (we refer to this as 
‘additional punishment’).9
Figure 3B shows that the amount spent on punishment by first movers who got 
back less than 150 points was clearly higher than the amount spent on retaliation by 
second movers who got punished (p = 0.01). Surely, this is partly explained by the fact 
that the earnings of first movers when they faced retaliation were lower than the 
earnings of second movers when they faced punishment. Therefore, since the amount 
of punishment or retaliation is limited by the earnings of the other player, first movers 
were able to spend more on reducing the other’s payoff. Still, if we normalize both 
punishment and retaliation using the maximum amount of points that an individual 
could assign to the other, we see that first movers are more aggressive punishers than 
second movers (p = 0.09). 
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FIGURE 3 – PUNISHMENT AND RETALIATION 
Note: A) Frequency of punishment (p11), retaliation (p21), and additional punishment (p12) over both 
parts. Frequencies are calculated over subjects who had the opportunity to punish/retaliate. B) Mean 
amount of points spent on punishment (p11), retaliation (p21), and additional punishment (p12) over 
both parts. 
                                                 
9 We only observe one case in which the second mover retaliated once again (p22 > 0). However, this is 
because in all the other pairs where the first mover punished a second time (p12 > 0), the first mover 
ended up with zero points or less and hence the punishment stage ended automatically. 
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Although it is not predicted by traditional economic theory (assuming own-payoff 
maximization), the punishment behavior of first movers is not surprising given that 
similar behavior has been observed in numerous experiments (see Camerer, 2003). 
Similarly, it is expected that the amount and frequency of punishment increases as the 
amount returned decreases. First movers who received 150 points punish less and less 
often than first movers who received 50 or 0 points (in each part p < 0.01). While 
comparing first movers who received 50 points with those who received 0 points 
shows that the latter punish significantly more only in the second part (p = 0.02, and in 
the other cases p > 0.28). 
We find more intriguing the willingness of second movers to retaliate. After 
all, these subjects had behaved unkindly by returning less than 150 points. 
Furthermore, when they had to decide whether they wanted to retaliate, 65.0% of the 
second movers had earnings that were actually higher or equal to the earnings of the 
first mover.10 It is remarkable that 7 (i.e. 53.8%) of these 13 second movers chose a 
positive amount of retaliation. Unlike for first movers, the retaliatory behavior of 
second movers does not seem to depend on the actions of the other player.11 For 
instance, there is no significant difference in the amount or the frequency of retaliation 
between second movers who received a large amount of punishment and second 
movers who received a small amount (above or below median punishment, p > 0.50). 
It is instructive to calculate how retaliation affects the first movers’ ‘real’ cost 
of punishment. Whenever first movers punish, they not only incur the cost of reducing 
the second mover’s earnings, but they also risk further losses if the second mover 
decides to retaliate.12 If there is no retaliation, the cost of punishment is 0.250 points 
per point reduced. Including the actual losses due to retaliation increases the average 
costs of punishment by 0.149 points per point reduced. Nonetheless, even though this 
                                                 
10 This tendency to retaliate against punishers could be the reason why we see ‘misdirected’ punishment 
in public good games (Cinyabuguma, Page, and Putterman, 2004; Gächter and Herrmann, 2005). In 
other words some low contributors might punish high contributors because they expect to be punished 
by them. 
11 We also find that retaliation does not depend on the amount transferred. There is no significant 
difference between second movers who returned 50 points and those who returned 0 points (p > 0.55) 
12 The only case in which second movers cannot retaliate after being punished occurs when first movers 
who get back 0 points spend all of their remaining earnings punishing the second mover. In this case, 
both subjects end up with 0 points and no further retaliation is possible. Overall, 24.3% of the cases in 
which there was positive punishment fit this description. 
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is a substantial increase of 59.4%, punishment remains an inexpensive tool for the 
reduction of the second mover’s earnings. This might explain why cooperation is 
sustained in spite of frequent retaliation. However, more generally the impact of 
retaliation on the costs of punishment will depend on the game played and its 
parameters. It is possible that in some cases retaliation will drive the costs of 
punishment to the point where punishment fails to sustain cooperation.13 A similar 
analysis for the real cost of retaliation (given losses due to additional punishment) 
gives that second movers incur an additional cost of 0.763 points per point reduced. 
This remarkable 305.6% increase might explain why second movers punish less 
aggressively than first movers do. We now turn to how first and second movers adjust 
their behavior from part 1 to part 2. 
3.3. Dynamics 
As already noted, the starkest difference between treatments concerning the behavior 
of first movers is the large decrease in cooperation from part 1 to part 2 in the baseline 
treatment compared to the punishment treatment. On closer inspection, this difference 
is due to two reasons. First, as shown in Figure 4A, in the baseline treatment 66.7% of 
the first movers who got back less than 150 points in part 1 defected in part 2. In 
contrast, in the punishment treatment it was only 19.0% (the difference is significant, 
p = 0.04). Second, in the baseline treatment more second movers chose to return less 
than 150 points (81.8% in the baseline treatment vs. 35.6% in the punishment 
treatment, p = 0.01). Hence, it appears that punishment has two desirable effects. On 
one hand, second movers anticipate punishment and as a result increase the amount 
returned. On the other hand, after experiencing selfish behavior, first movers are more 
willing to keep on cooperating if they have the opportunity to punish. In fact, if we 
examine how first movers in the punishment treatment adjust their behavior, we find 
that, among the first movers who received less than 150 points, those who punished 
seem to be more likely to cooperate once again than those who did not punish (see 
Figure 4B). 
 
                                                 
13 In public good settings, punishment stops sustaining cooperation when the cost of punishing 
increases over 0.500 per point reduced (Nikiforakis and Normann, 2005). 
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FIGURE 4 – DEFECTION IN PART 2 DEPENDING ON THE EVENTS IN PART 1 
Note: A) Percentage of first movers who defect in part 2 depending on the amount returned by the 
second mover of part 1 in each treatment. B) Percentage of first movers who defect in part 2 
depending on whether or not they punished the second mover of part 1 for a low return. 
We now turn to the effects of punishment on the future behavior of second movers. If 
we concentrate on second movers who had a good chance of being punished (i.e. those 
who returned less than 150), we find that, on average, second movers who were not 
punished decrease the amount returned by 25.0 points whereas those who were 
punished increase it by 10.0 points (p = 0.22). Hence, although actual punishment 
does promote prosocial behavior, the effect is not particularly strong. In other words, 
punishment has a bigger impact by deterring second movers from returning low 
amounts in the first place than by increasing the returns of those who behave selfishly 
in spite of the threat of punishment. For example, if none of the second movers who 
returned a low amount had been punished in period 1, the average return in period 2 
would have been 87.7 points (instead of 96.6 points). In contrast, if the threat of 
punishment had not been there at all then the average return would have been as in the 
baseline treatment (i.e. 41.7 points). 
Lastly, we analyze the impact of retaliation on both future cooperation and 
punishment by first movers. In general, retaliation in part 1 does not deter first movers 
from cooperating in part 2. For instance, among first movers who punished a low 
return in part 1, those who received retaliation were as likely to cooperate in part 2 as 
those who received no retaliation (p = 0.64). It is also the case that retaliation does not 
deter first movers from punishing. Among the first movers who punished in part 1 and 
then received a low return in part 2, those who had received positive retaliation 
punished in part 2 as often as those who had received no retaliation (p = 0.80). In fact, 
they punished as often as those who received a low return in part 2 after they had 
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received a high return in part 1 (p = 0.36). The main findings from the behavioral data 
are summarized in the following result: 
RESULT 1: In the presence of punishment opportunities, cooperation is 
sustained at high levels. This is because, second movers return more, and first 
movers who punish do not stop cooperating after experiencing opportunistic 
behavior. Punishment of opportunistic behavior is common and persistent 
despite the fact that in numerous cases punishment leads to retaliation by 
second movers. 
4. Emotions and Behavior 
In the following section we investigate the relationship between the subjects’ behavior 
and their emotional response. To begin, we concentrate on the emotions of first 
movers, and particularly on the relationship between anger and punishment. 
Subsequently, we analyze what triggers first movers to feel high intensities of anger. 
We then turn to study the emotional reaction of second movers. First, we investigate 
the relationship between guilt and the second movers’ decision to retaliate. Second, 
we try to determine what causes second movers to feel guilt. 
Throughout the section, we report the results of tests done with the emotion of 
anger and the emotion of guilt. However, we should note that we find very similar 
results and significance levels if we substitute anger with irritation or (lack of) 
happiness, or if we substitute guilt with shame. This hints at the possibility that some 
of these emotions are in fact measuring the same underlying effect. To confirm 
whether this is the case we applied principal factor analysis to the emotions data (for 
the details and the factor loadings see Table C1 in Appendix C). We find three factors 
that summarize the subjects’ emotional response. The first factor can be interpreted as 
anger-like emotions, the second factor as guilt-like emotions, and the third factor, 
although less clear, can be seen as a combination of gratitude and happiness. 
4.1. Anger and punishment 
Throughout the experiment, anger is clearly related to the punishment decision. As is 
illustrated in Figure 5, first movers who were angry after observing the amount 
returned by the second mover punish more and more often than first movers who were 
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not angry (p < 0.01 in both parts).14 Furthermore, although there are few observations, 
a similar pattern is observed in the second punishment round. On average, after 
observing the amount of retaliation assigned to them, first movers who felt angry 
punish more than first movers who did not feel as angry (p = 0.11 for the amount of 
additional punishment and p = 0.41 for its frequency). 
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FIGURE 5 – ANGER AND PUNISHMENT 
Note: A) Frequency of punishment by first movers depending on anger. B) Mean amount of points 
spent on punishment by first movers depending on anger. 
Having found that punishment is related to experienced anger, the question arises 
what explains the different intensities of anger (the emotional reaction of first movers 
to the amount returned can be found in Appendix B). In both treatments, the most 
important trigger of high intensities of anger is simply receiving back less than 150 
points. First movers who received 150 points felt lower intensities of anger than first 
movers who received either 50 or 0 points (p = 0.01, see Table B3). It is also the case 
that first movers who received 0 points back were angrier than those who received 50 
points back (p = 0.03). 
In addition to the amount returned, the first movers’ expectations have an 
effect on the intensity of anger. In particular, first movers who overestimated the 
amount returned by the second mover tended to be angrier than first movers who 
underestimated it. For example, if we control for the amount that was actually 
returned by concentrating on first movers who got back 50 points, we find that first 
movers who were expecting back 150 points were angrier than first movers who were 
expecting back 50 or 0 points (p = 0.01). 
                                                 
14 Throughout the paper, we refer to a person feeling ‘angry’ if the reported value for anger was above 
the median, and as feeling ‘not angry’ if the value was below or equal to the median. The same is true 
in the case of guilt. 
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Lastly, we also observe that the amount of anger experienced by first movers is 
related to their fairness perceptions. First movers who thought it is unfair to return low 
amounts were angrier than those who thought that it is fair to return low amounts 
(below or above median fairness). For instance, if we look again only at first movers 
who got back 50 points, we find that first movers who thought returning 50 was unfair 
were angrier than first movers who thought returning 50 was fair (p = 0.01). 
We get similar results in a regression. Specifically, we estimate anger using the 
amount returned, the expected amount returned, the perceived fairness of returning 50 
points, and some demographic variables. We find first movers feel angrier the less is 
returned. Especially if they were expecting a return of 150 points or considered low 
returns to be very unfair (see Table C2 in Appendix C). 
Focusing on the emotional reaction of first movers to the amount of retaliation 
received from the second mover gives a comparable finding. Namely, first movers 
who faced no retaliation experienced lower intensities of anger than first movers who 
faced positive retaliation (p = 0.04, see Table B4). Unfortunately, in this case we do 
not have enough observations to test for the effects of expectations and fairness 
perceptions. These findings are summarized in the following result. 
RESULT 2: First movers who punish do so because they are angry. High 
intensities of anger are triggered by selfish behavior by the second mover, 
especially if it is unexpected and considered unfair. Retaliation by second 
movers also makes first movers angry and leads to additional punishment. 
4.2. Guilt and retaliation 
We now turn to the relationship between the emotions and behavior of second movers 
(the emotional reaction of second movers can be found in Table B5). We find that 
feelings of guilt are clearly related to retaliation.15 In particular, second movers who 
felt no guilt are more likely to retaliate than other second movers. Furthermore, we 
also find that, for second movers who were punished, experiencing guilt induces them 
to correct their behavior. 
As can be seen in Figure 6A, second movers who felt no guilt after being 
punished are more likely to retaliate than second movers who felt guilty (p = 0.04). 
We also get a similar result if we test for differences in the amount of points spent on 
retaliation (p = 0.08). 
                                                 
15 In contrast, feelings of guilt are not related to the behavior of first movers. 
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FIGURE 6 – GUILT, ANGER, AND RETALIATION 
Note: A) Frequency of retaliation by second movers depending on anger and guilt. B) Mean amount 
of points spent on retaliation by second movers depending on anger and guilt. 
The effect of guilt can be further described if we analyze the interaction of guilt and 
anger. Given that anger motivates first movers to punish, one could think that, if 
second movers get angry when they are punished, anger could motivate second 
movers to retaliate. Indeed, a simple look at the relationship between anger and 
retaliation suggests that second movers who are angry retaliate more and more often 
than second movers who are not angry (see Figure 6). However, these differences are 
not significant (p = 0.77 for the differences in the amount of retaliation and p = 0.82 
for the differences in frequency). 
Examining the interaction of anger and guilt clarifies why some of the angry 
second movers do not retaliate. Second movers who were angry and felt no guilt 
retaliate more and more frequently than second movers who were angry and felt guilt 
(p = 0.02 and p = 0.02). For second movers who were not angry, there are no 
significant differences between those who felt no guilt and those who did (p > 0.79). 
Hence, guilt appears to influence the behavior of second movers by suppressing their 
anger-induced desire to retaliate. 
In addition to retaliation, guilt seems to be related to how second movers 
adjust their behavior from part 1 to part 2. In Section 3 it was shown that second 
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movers who were punished tend to return more in the subsequent part than second 
movers who were not punished. However, this effect is not very strong. The emotional 
reaction of second movers hints that the propensity of second movers to adjust their 
behavior after being punished depends on whether they felt guilty or not. On average, 
second movers who felt guilt after being punished increase the amount returned by 
50.0 points whereas those who felt no guilt decrease the amount returned by 9.1 points 
(p = 0.11). Next, we explain the differences in the intensities of anger and guilt 
experienced by second movers. 
The most important reason why second movers get angry is simply receiving a 
positive amount of punishment (see Table B5). For example, second movers who were 
punished at least once reported significantly more anger than those who were never 
punished (p = 0.01).16 We further investigate the effect of punishment on anger 
through a regression. We estimate anger among second movers who received a 
positive amount of punishment using demographic variables and three variables 
capturing the interaction between the amount of punishment and the amount returned. 
The regression is available in Table C3. We find that higher amounts of punishment 
trigger higher intensities of anger. Furthermore, the increase in anger is bigger when 
the second mover returns a high amount.17 This is understandable given that the more 
a second mover returns, the more undeserved is the punishment. 
The clearest trigger of high intensities of guilt is acting selfishly. Second 
movers who returned 150 points reported lower intensities of guilt than those who 
transferred less (p = 0.02).18 If anticipated, this type of emotional reaction supports the 
idea that some individuals will not act selfishly in order to avoid feelings of guilt. We 
do not find, however, a difference between the intensity of guilt reported by second 
movers who returned 50 points and those who returned 0 points (p = 0.53). 
                                                 
16 This is also true if we test only among second movers who returned less than 150 points (p = 0.01). 
17 We use three variables Ir with r ∈ {0, 50, 150}. Ir = 0 if the amount returned was different from r and 
Ir = the amount of punishment received if the amount returned was r. We obtain positive and significant 
coefficients for I0, I50, and I150 (p < 0.02) with the coefficient for I0 being the smallest and the one for 
I150 being the largest. The coefficient of I150 is significantly different from those of I0 and I50 (Wald 
tests, p < 0.01). The coefficient of I50 is higher but not significantly different from the coefficient of I0 
(Wald test, p = 0.21). See Table C3 in Appendix C for details. 
18 This result is not driven by the different punishment rates faced by subjects who returned 150 points 
and by those who returned less. For example, second movers who returned 150 points and were not 
punished felt lower intensities of guilt than second movers who returned less than 150 points and were 
not punished (p = 0.01). 
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Interestingly, punishment does not seem to influence the intensity of guilt 
experienced by second movers. For example, among second movers who returned less 
than 150, there is no significant difference between the amount of guilt reported by 
those who were punished and by those who were not (p = 0.58).  
We do not find that, for a given transferred amount, fairness perceptions 
influence the intensity of guilt. However, we do find that second movers who thought 
it is unfair to return low amounts transferred significantly more than those who 
thought that it is fair to return low amounts (117.5 vs. 59.4, p < 0.01). Hence, the 
apparent disconnection between guilt and fairness perceptions might be due to the 
correlation between fairness perceptions and the amount returned. A possible 
explanation for this is that fair-minded second movers feel more guilt when 
transferring a low amount. Hence, they return a high amount in order to avoid high 
intensities of guilt. The following result summarizes the findings concerning guilt. 
RESULT 3: Second movers who retaliate do so because they are angry and do 
not feel guilt. In addition, following the feeling of guilt, second movers are 
more likely to rectify selfish behavior. High intensities of anger are triggered 
by punishment, especially if the second mover had returned a high amount. 
High intensities of guilt are triggered by selfish behavior and are not affected 
by punishment. 
5. Discussion and Conclusions 
In this paper, we have shown that a realistic punishment institution, in which multiple 
rounds of punishment and retaliation are possible, is an effective tool for the support 
of cooperative behavior. However, retaliation is a commonly observed behavior that 
often results in the extreme reduction of the payoffs of the individuals involved. 
Furthermore, we confirm that anger-like emotions are an important motivation for 
punishment. Selfish behavior induces anger and thus increases the likelihood of 
punishment. Lastly, we have shown that the experience of prosocial emotions, namely 
shame and guilt, restrain angry individuals from retaliating. Therefore, prosocial 
emotions can be seen as a mechanism managing the behavioral reactions of anger. 
It is important to have a good understanding of the motivations and reactions 
of both the punishers and the punished in order to understand when costly punishment 
can effectively enforce cooperative behavior. We find interesting that individuals who 
are willing to punish are also willing to keep on cooperating. This guaranties that, as 
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long as these individuals have the opportunity to punish, cooperation can be sustained. 
In addition, the same type of behavior is necessary to support punishment in the 
presence of retaliation. If retaliation deters individuals from using the punishment 
mechanism, cooperation can unravel (Nikiforakis, 2005). However, if the opportunity 
to punish back always exists, this could prevent retaliation from limiting the 
punishment of selfish behavior. 
As expected, we find that anger motivates individuals to punish opportunistic 
behavior. Furthermore, we confirm that individuals feel angrier the more money the 
other player took (Bosman and van Winden, 2002), the more unexpected was the 
opportunistic act (Ben-Shakhar et al., 2004), and the more strongly the individual felt 
about fairness (Pillutla and Murnighan, 1996). In fact, our results show that each of 
these motivations has a separate effect on the intensity of anger and thus on the 
propensity to punish. 
Knowing that punishment is triggered by the emotion of anger can help us 
model this type of behavior. If anger induced punishment gives pleasure to the 
punisher (Quervain et al., 2004), punishment can be interpreted as the consumption of 
a good. Thus, allowing us to apply standard economic analysis to an otherwise 
puzzling phenomenon (see Carpenter, 2004). It is important to point out that the action 
tendency of anger is to attack (Lazarus, 1991), and thus, to harm whoever is 
negatively affecting our interests. Therefore, even if anger was triggered by unfair 
behavior (e.g. deviations from equality or a maximin norm), the goal of angry 
individuals is to harm the other party, and not, through punishment, to correct unfair 
material outcomes.19 For example, if in our game first movers who got back 50 points 
used punishment to rectify an unfair distribution of income, they should not spend 
more than 66.67 points on punishment (this amount gives both players equal 
earnings). However, 31.3% of first movers in precisely this situation punished, at least 
once, by more than 66.67 points. In this sense, outcome based models of social 
preferences such as Fehr and Schmidt (1999), and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) miss 
an important characteristic of punishment behavior (see also Reuben and van Winden, 
2006). 
                                                 
19 In this respect, as is argued by Carpenter and Matthews (2005), there is an important difference 
between anger-induced punishment by the affected individual and indignation-induced punishment by 
an unaffected third party. 
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An important and yet overlooked aspect of punishment is the emotional 
reaction of the punished. As was shown in this paper, prosocial emotions such as guilt 
play a crucial role for the use of punishment for the enforcement of social norms. In 
Section 4 we have shown that feeling guilty helps explain why some individuals who 
acted selfishly adjust their behavior whereas others do not. It has been observed that in 
public good games, the use of non-monetary punishment has a positive effect on 
contribution levels.20 Non-monetary punishment has the desirable property that it can 
affect behavior without destroying resources. However, as shown by Noussair and 
Tucker (2005), the lack of real consequences for free-riders makes this effect 
deteriorate over time. This suggests that the effect of guilt is not very strong when 
punishment is only symbolic. Our results indicate that it is the combination of feeling 
guilty and receiving monetary punishment that has a significant effect on behavior. In 
this sense, the best performing punishment institution might be one in which both 
symbolic and monetary punishments are available (Noussair and Tucker, 2005). 
Another essential role for guilt is the prevention of retaliation by punished 
individuals. As is stated in Result 3, even if they acted unkindly, individuals do feel 
angry when they are punished. However, it is only those individuals who are angry 
and do not feel guilty that decide to retaliate. Therefore, if it were not for some 
individuals experiencing guilt, retaliation would be much more common and 
punishment of selfish behavior much more costly. For example, if second movers who 
felt guilty had behaved as second movers who did not feel guilty (controlling for 
anger) then retaliation would have been 69.8% more frequent and 72.4% higher. 
Furthermore, the decrease in the amount returned from part 1 to part 2 would have 
been 42.2% more severe. Social emotions like guilt are thus essential for the 
effectiveness of a punishment institution. This fits the assumption that social emotions 
coevolved with institutions and anger-like emotions in order to limit antisocial actions 
(Bowles and Gintis, 2001). An interesting question for further exploration is the 
specific evolutionary mechanisms that lead to this situation.  
Social emotions (like shame and guilt) are characteristic human emotions that 
facilitate prosocial behavior. Shame and guilt are both ‘self-reproach’ emotions 
elicited by the individuals’ own blameworthy actions (Ortony, Clore, and Collins, 
                                                 
20 For instance, Masclet et al. (2003) use symbolic punishment points and find that, in the short run, 
they work almost as well as real punishment points. Barr (2001) reports that the public blaming of the 
free-rider can increase cooperation in future rounds. 
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1988). This study was not designed to differentiate between the effects of these two 
emotions. However, we should note that the emotions’ action tendencies are different 
(Tangney and Dearing, 2002). Guilt is related to the blameworthiness of an act and is 
thus more likely to result in reparation and action. Shame is related to a devaluation of 
the self and is more likely to result in avoidance of further contact.21 Therefore, in 
some settings, increasing feelings of shame (e.g. through framing) will not lead to an 
increase in prosocial behavior. For instance, if individuals have the possibility to avoid 
contact altogether, they might prefer to do so instead of participating in an activity 
where feelings of shame ‘force’ them to act prosocially (Lazear, Malmendier, and 
Weber, 2005). Finally, in addition to the effects of social emotions observed in this 
study, the anticipation of shame and guilt might induce norm-abiding behavior.  
 
Appendix A – Instructions 
These are the instructions for first movers in the punishment treatment. The 
instructions for second movers and for the baseline treatment are available upon 
request. 
Instructions for part 1 
There are two types of participants in this part, participants A and participants B. Half 
of the persons participating in the experiment will be in the role of participant A, and 
the other half in that of participant B. You are a participant A. 
In part 1 of the experiment, you will be randomly assigned a participant B. 
During this part, you will interact only with this participant B. Moreover, you will not 
interact again with this participant in part 2 of the experiment. Part 1 consists of three 
steps. In step one, you must decide whether you will transfer points to participant B or 
if you will retain the points for yourself. In step two, participant B will decide if he 
will transfer points to you or if he will keep them himself. In step three, both of you 
must again make a decision. There are various options in step three, which will be 
                                                 
21 Economists usually distinguish shame and guilt by the visibility of behavior. Shame is said to be 
triggered in social situations in which actions are seen by others, whereas guilt is more related to 
internalized values and hence is not influenced by the presence of others (e.g. Kandel and Lazear, 
1992). However, research by psychologists has shown that people feel shame even when their actions 
are unobserved (Tangney et al., 1996), and that the experience of guilt varies considerably depending 
on the interpersonal context (Baumeister, Stillwell, and Heatherton, 1994). 
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explained below. We will also describe the exact experimental procedure on the next 
pages. 
Procedure for the three steps  
At the beginning of part 1 you and participant B will each receive 100 points as 
earnings. 
Step one 
At the beginning of the first step you will receive 50 decision points. Participant B 
will receive no decision points. In step one, you must decide whether you want to 
transfer your 50 decision points to participant B or transfer no points to participant B. 
If you transfer the 50 points, they will be multiplied by six, meaning that participant B 
will receive 6×50 = 300 points. Then, step two begins. If you decide to transfer 
nothing part 1 will end here.  
Step two 
In step two, participant B has to decide whether he will transfer 150, 50 or 0 points to 
you. You will then receive exactly the number of points B transferred. 
  
Therefore, four possibilities exist after the first two steps: 
 
 Your additional earnings 
B’s additional 
earnings 
You retain your decision points. 50 points 0 points 
You transfer your decision points 
and B transfers 150 points. 
150 points 150 points 
You transfer your decision points 
and B transfers 50 points. 
50 points 250 points 
You transfer your decision points 
and B transfers nothing. 
0 points 300 points 
Hence, after step two your total earnings will be: 
100 + the additional earnings from the table above. 
Step three 
In step three, you will be informed how many points participant B transferred to you. 
Now, you can assign penalty points to participant B. The assignment of penalty points 
has financial consequences for both participants, A and B. Each penalty point which 
you assign costs you one point, while four points are deducted from your participant 
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B. If you assign three penalty points to participant B, this will cost you three points 
and participant B will have twelve points deducted.  
You cannot deduct more points from participant B than his total earnings in 
that part (i.e. 100 + B’s additional earnings). If participant B has 250 points after step 
2, then with your assignment of penalty points you can reduce his earnings by at most 
250 points. Hence, as long as your participant B has positive earnings, you can assign 
him as many penalty points as you want. You can also assign him no penalty points. 
 Participant B will then be informed how many penalty points you assigned him 
and how many points were deducted from his earnings. If you decided not to assign 
penalty points, part 1 will end here. If you assigned penalty points to participant B, he 
can decide to assign penalty points to you. The assignment of penalty points has the 
same financial consequences as described above. Each penalty point that participant B 
assigns to you costs him one point, while four points are deducted from your earnings. 
You can not be deducted more points than the total earnings you own at that moment. 
If participant B decides to assign no penalty points to you, part 1 will end here. Note: 
Participant B can assign penalty points even if his earnings at that point are zero. If he 
does so, he will lose points in part 1 of the experiment.  
If participant B assigned you penalty points, you and participant B will have 
the option to assign penalty points to each other in turns. Part 1 will end when either 
you or participant B decides to assign no penalty points, or if either you or participant 
B can not be assigned penalty points because your or his earnings are zero or less. In 
other words, as long as one of you assigns a positive amount of penalty points, the 
other will have the opportunity to assign penalty points back. Note that, you will be 
able to assign penalty points even if your earnings at that point are zero. Furthermore, 
you cannot be assigned penalty points if your own earnings are zero. 
Finally 
Remember that, you participate in part 1 only once. Therefore consider your decisions 
carefully. At the end of part 1 you will receive instructions for part 2 of the 
experiment. 
 
Instructions for part 2 
We will now give you the instructions for part 2 of the experiment.  
Also in this part there will be two types of participants, participants A and 
participants B. Every person participating in the experiment will be in the role they 
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had in part 1. Therefore, you are a participant A. As in part 1 you will be randomly 
assigned a participant B. During this part, you will interact only with this participant 
B. You can be certain that this participant B is not the same person as in part 1.  
This part will consist of the same three steps as part 1. Therefore exactly the 
same instructions apply for part 2 as for part 1. Remember that you will participate in 
this part only once. Therefore consider your decisions carefully. 
 
Examples of questions in the self-reports 
To measure emotions:  
? Indicate how intensely you feel each of the following emotions right now, 
after knowing the amount that B transferred to you?  
The subject then filled in a series of seven-point scales that ranged from ‘not at all’ (1) 
to ‘very intensely' (7). 
 
To measure expectations: 
? Player A can now assign you penalty points. How many penalty points do you 
think A will assign to you?  
The subject then entered a point estimate. 
 
To measure fairness perceptions: 
? Suppose that participant A transfers the 50 decision points to participant B. 
Participant B has to choose to transfer back either 150 points, 50 points or 0 
points. In your opinion, how fair do you believe is each of these choices: 
If participant B transfers back 150 (50, 0) points this choice is ... ? 
The subject then filled in three seven-point scales (one for each choice) that ranged 
from ‘very unfair’ (1) to ‘very fair’ (7). 
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 Appendix B – Descriptive Statistics  
Table B1 summarizes of the behavioral data for the punishment treatment. 
TABLE B1 – SUMMARY OF THE BEHAVIORAL DATA IN THE PUNISHMENT TREATMENT 
 Part 1 Part 2 Both 
parts22
Cooperation by first movers    
Number of observations 68 68 68 
Frequency of cooperation 86.4 86.4 86.4 
Mean amount of points sent (cooperation) 
standard deviation 
43.4 
(17.1) 
43.4 
(17.1) 
43.4 
(14.7) 
Returns by second movers    
Number of observations 59 59 66 
Frequency of returning 150 0.644 0.559 0.614 
Frequency of returning 50 0.237 0.254 0.227 
Frequency of returning 0 0.119 0.186 0.159 
Mean amount of points returned 
standard deviation 
108.5 
(58.1) 
96.6 
(62.9) 
103.4 
(57.5) 
Punishment by first movers    
Number of observations 59 59 63 
Frequency of punishment 0.305 0.254 0.278 
Mean amount of points spent on punishment 
standard deviation 
17.3 
(31.4) 
18.7 
(35.5) 
18.1 
(26.2) 
Retaliation by second movers    
Number of observations 16 9 20 
Frequency of retaliation 0.375 0.444 0.400 
Mean amount of points spent on retaliation 
standard deviation 
5.5 
(8.7) 
5.9 
(10.0) 
5.2 
(8.2) 
Additional punishment by first movers    
Number of observations 5 4 9 
Frequency of additional punishment 0.600 0.500 0.556 
Mean amount of points spent on additional punishment 
standard deviation 
6.2 
(8.8) 
24.3 
(28.0) 
14.2 
(20.6) 
                                                 
22 To be precise the data in this column is the mean behavior of each subject across both parts. In other 
words, first we take the mean behavior across parts for each subject and then we take the mean across 
all subjects. In the cases where a subject had only one opportunity to take an action, we take the data 
from that part as that subject’s mean. 
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Table B2 summarizes of the behavioral data for the baseline treatment. 
TABLE B2 – SUMMARY OF THE BEHAVIORAL DATA IN THE BASELINE TREATMENT 
 Part 1 Part 2 Both 
parts
Cooperation by first movers    
Number of observations 13 13 13 
Frequency of cooperation 84.6 46.2 65.4 
Points sent (cooperation) 
standard deviation 
42.3 
(18.8) 
23.1 
(25.9) 
32.7 
(15.8) 
Returns by second movers    
Number of observations 11 6 12 
Frequency of returning 150 0.182 0.167 0.167 
Frequency of returning 50 0.182 0.333 0.208 
Frequency of returning 0 0.636 0.500 0.625 
Points returned 
standard deviation 
36.4 
(59.5) 
41.7 
(58.5) 
35.4 
(56.9) 
 
The emotional reaction of first movers in the punishment treatment is summarized in 
Table B3 and Table B4. In the baseline treatment, the emotional reaction of first 
movers was statistically indistinguishable from the one in the punishment treatment.  
TABLE B3 – MEAN EMOTIONAL INTENSITY OF FIRST MOVERS AFTER OBSERVING THE AMOUNT 
RETURNED BY THE SECOND MOVER IN THE PUNISHMENT TREATMENT 
Emotions Got back 150 Got back 50 Got back 0 
Anger 
standard deviation 
1.1 
(0.5) 
4.5 
(1.9) 
5.8 
(1.5) 
Irritation 
standard deviation 
1.2 
(0.7) 
5.0 
(1.5) 
6.1 
(1.5) 
Happiness 
standard deviation 
6.1 
(1.0) 
2.3 
(1.4) 
1.8 
(1.1) 
Gratitude 
standard deviation 
4.9 
(1.8) 
2.4 
(1.7) 
1.6 
(1.1) 
Shame 
standard deviation 
1.2 
(0.5) 
1.9 
(1.6) 
2.9 
(2.3) 
Guilt 
standard deviation 
1.1 
(0.5) 
1.3 
(0.9) 
1.8 
(1.7) 
Surprise 
standard deviation 
4.2 
(1.6) 
3.9 
(1.7) 
4.5 
(2.5) 
Number of observations 53 27 17 
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TABLE B4 – MEAN EMOTIONAL INTENSITY OF FIRST MOVERS AFTER OBSERVING THE AMOUNT OF 
RETALIATION THEY RECEIVED FROM THE SECOND MOVER 
Emotions No Retaliation Positive Retaliation 
Anger 
standard deviation 
1.9 
(1.5) 
3.6 
(2.2) 
Irritation 
standard deviation 
2.2 
(1.7) 
4.7 
(2.2) 
Happiness 
standard deviation 
3.4 
(1.8) 
2.6 
(1.3) 
Gratitude 
standard deviation 
2.4 
(2.0) 
2.7 
(1.9) 
Shame 
standard deviation 
2.1 
(1.8) 
1.3 
(0.9) 
Guilt 
standard deviation 
2.1 
(1.9) 
1.5 
(1.1) 
Surprise 
standard deviation 
4.8 
(1.9) 
2.3 
(1.6) 
Number of observations 14 10 
 
The emotional reaction of second movers is summarized in Table B5. 
TABLE B5 – MEAN EMOTIONAL INTENSITY OF SECOND MOVERS AFTER OBSERVING THE AMOUNT 
OF PUNISHMENT THEY RECIVED FROM THE FIRST MOVER 
Emotions No Punishment Positive Punishment 
Anger 
standard deviation 
1.1 
(0.8) 
3.7 
(1.9) 
Irritation 
standard deviation 
1.3 
(1.2) 
4.1 
(2.3) 
Happiness 
standard deviation 
5.0 
(1.6) 
2.0 
(1.2) 
Gratitude 
standard deviation 
4.0 
(2.0) 
2.5 
(1.5) 
Shame 
standard deviation 
1.2 
(0.9) 
1.5 
(0.9) 
Guilt 
standard deviation 
1.4 
(1.1) 
1.9 
(1.3) 
Surprise 
standard deviation 
2.5 
(1.9) 
4.6 
(2.1) 
Number of observations 55 25 
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 Appendix C – Additional Data Analysis  
Table C1 reports the results of applying principal factor analysis to the subjects’ 
emotional response. We report the results when we use the emotional response of first 
movers to the amount returned and also when we use the emotional response of 
second movers to the amount of punishment. In both cases, we use orthogonal 
varimax rotation. Results do not vary significantly if we combine the emotional 
response of first and second movers or if we use other rotation methods. 
TABLE C1 – FACTORS UNDERLYING THE SUBJECTS EMOTIONAL RESPONSE 
 First Movers Second Movers 
Factors 1st 2nd 3rd 1 – h2 1st 2nd 3rd 1 – h2
Proportion of 
variance explained 
0.83 0.18 0.13 – 0.65 0.34 0.15 – 
 Factor loadings 
Anger 0.85 0.18 0.07 0.23 0.89 0.23 –0.09 0.15 
Irritation 0.90 0.12 0.06 0.17 0.86 0.18 –0.13 0.21 
Happiness –0.84 –0.10 0.28 0.21 –0.57 0.05 0.49 0.43 
Gratitude –0.67 –0.04 0.33 0.44 –0.22 0.25 0.51 0.63 
Shame 0.33 0.54 0.04 0.59 0.27 0.72 0.08 0.40 
Guilt 0.18 0.53 –0.04 0.69 0.23 0.71 0.07 0.43 
Surprise –0.07 0.03 0.50 0.74 0.57 0.24 0.09 0.61 
 KMO test = 0.78 KMO test = 0.74 
 
Table C2 presents a model estimating the intensity of anger experienced by first 
movers after they observed the amount of points returned by the second mover in the 
punishment treatment. Ordered probit estimates using robust standard errors and 
clustering on each subject. Note that in the regression we take into account the effect 
of perceived fairness norms, by estimating the models using the variable ‘Fairness of 
returning 50 points’. The reason for this is that this variable exhibited the most 
variance among the three variables measuring fairness perceptions. For the variable 
‘Fairness of returning 150 points’, 85.3% of subjects agreed that is was very fair. For 
the variable ‘Fairness of returning 0 points’, 83.1% of subjects agreed that is was very 
unfair. 
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TABLE C2 – ORDERED PROBIT MODEL ESTIMATING FIRST MOVERS’ ANGER 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error p-value 
Return = 50 
Return = 0 
Expected Return = 50 
Expected Return = 0 
Fairness of Returning 50 
Economist 
Female 
–2.648 
–3.352 
–0.368 
–0.891 
–0.226 
–0.043 
–0.322 
0.337 
0.438 
0.338 
0.473 
0.115 
0.302 
0.290 
0.000 
0.000 
0.276 
0.059 
0.049 
0.888 
0.267 
Number of obs.  =  118     LR χ2(7)  =  111.03 
Log likelihood  =  –96.765     Prob > χ2  =  0.000 
Note: The variables ‘Return = x’ = 1 if the return was x, and 0 otherwise. The variable ‘Fairness of 
returning 50’ ranges from 1 = ‘very unfair’ to 7 = ‘very fair’. Dummy variables: Economist = 1 if 
economics mayor, 0 otherwise; Female = 1 if female, 0 if male. 
The coefficients of ‘Return = 50’ and ‘Return = 0’ are significantly different from 
each other (Wald test, p = 0.05). That is, anger is higher when the return is 0 points. 
Table C3 presents a model estimating the intensity of anger experienced by 
second movers who received a positive amount of punishment. Ordered probit 
estimates using robust standard errors and clustering on each subject. 
TABLE C3 – ORDERED PROBIT MODEL ESTIMATING SECOND MOVERS’ ANGER 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error p-value 
Punishment if Return = 150 
Punishment if Return = 50 
Punishment if Return = 0 
Economist 
Female 
–0.208 
–0.028 
–0.021 
–0.107 
–0.735 
0.074 
0.010 
0.008 
0.411 
0.622 
0.005 
0.004 
0.014 
0.794 
0.237 
Number of obs.  =  33      LR χ2(5)  =  14.18 
Log likelihood  =  –58.228     Prob > χ2  =  0.015 
Note: The variables ‘Punishment if Return = x’ = amount of punishment if the return was x, and 0 
otherwise. The other variables are the same as in Table C2. 
The coefficient of the variable ‘Punishment if Return = 150’ is significantly different 
from those of ‘Punishment if Return = 50’ and ‘Punishment if Return = 0’ (Wald tests, 
p < 0.01). This indicates that second movers get angrier if they are punished for 
transferring a high amount. The coefficient of ‘Punishment if Return = 50’ is higher 
but not significantly different from the coefficient of ‘Punishment if Return = 0’ 
(Wald test, p = 0.21). 
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